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CHAPTER 1 
PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Money launderers have long taken advantage of the cover offered by operating 
in multiple jurisdictions.1 All but the most incompetent criminals know that 
prosecution and investigation of crimes are more complicated when multiple 
jurisdictions are involved.2 From the perspective of money launderers, the 
internet offers high degrees of anonymity while allowing for almost instantaneous 
financial transactions. As a result, money launderers have turned increasingly to 
the internet as an efficient means of concealing the origin of dirty money. Ideally, 
a cyber money launderer would use at least one jurisdiction with bank secrecy 
laws while using loopholes in other legal systems and international co-operation 
to facilitate his criminal activities. The growing trends towards globalisation and 
increased international trade make life even easier for cyber money launderers. 
Financial services have long been global and electronic, allowing transfers of 
money around the globe from literally anywhere. 
 
Cyber money laundering is a relatively new concept. Not much research has 
been done on the topic as compared to other aspects of anti-money laundering 
law. More specifically, there is no real authority on the issue of jurisdiction over 
cyber money laundering. Cyber money laundering is essentially money 
laundering conducted over the internet. It is, therefore, simply a new technique of 
committing the traditional crime of money laundering. As a result, the internet is a 
mere tool used by money launderers to launder dirty money in cyberspace. 
                                                 
1 Evans (1995: 1). 
2 Evans (1995: 1). 
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However, cyber money laundering would qualify in some instances as a 
cybercrime. The fight against cyber money laundering thus requires an 
examination of both cybercrime and of the existing principles of anti-money 
laundering initiatives. 
 
Given the scale of money laundering, it is not surprising that there are numerous 
bodies which are involved in the battle against it. Although most of these bodies 
initially did not envisage the technical difficulties associated with cyber money 
laundering, it is safe to assume that their work nevertheless will be useful in 
combating it. The Convention on Cybercrime of 2001 is indispensable in the fight 
against cyber money laundering. It was drafted by the Council of Europe but it 
was intended to be an international instrument which would combat cybercrime 
effectively.3 Although the Convention on Cybercrime does not deal directly with 
the issue of cyber money laundering, it does allow law enforcement agencies to 
pursue it indirectly as a crime. 
 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body 
established for the sole purpose of creating anti-laundering strategies based on 
international co-operation. The FATF was established as early as 1989 and has 
proved to be invaluable in the fight against money laundering. As combating 
money laundering is its sole purpose, the FATF has managed to keep abreast of 
the latest developments in money laundering. Relevant to cyber money 
laundering is the fact that banks and other financial institutions are advised not to 
keep anonymous accounts and to verify the existence of their customers.4 In 
addition to this, banks and financial institutions are advised to take reasonable 
                                                 
3 Lovet (2009: 68). 
4 Jaarsveld (2004: 698). 
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measures to establish the true identity of their customers.5  
 
Jurisdiction over money laundering is determined largely by the internal 
legislation of a state, in the light of international law and the recommendations of 
international institutions. Cybercrimes have been studied without specific focus 
on the issue of cyber money laundering. This holds true especially in respect of 
jurisdiction over cyber money laundering. The principles governing a sovereign 
state’s right to prohibit certain conduct are well established with regard to 
conduct in the real, physical world. The same applies to a state’s powers to 
punish those who commit such prohibited conduct. However, cybercrimes tend 
to complicate these basic principles as they often stretch across the territories of 
several states. This can become even more complex when criminals route their 
attacks through computers in different countries.6  
 
Cyber money laundering cannot be studied without reference to jurisdiction over 
cybercrimes. As the internet allows cyber money launderers to take full 
advantage of multiple jurisdictions, the prosecution of cyber money laundering 
could give rise to positive jurisdictional conflicts. In other words, more than one 
state may wish to prosecute the same act of cyber money laundering. The issue 
of conflicting jurisdictions is a serious one which has yet to be resolved in 
international law. 
 
It is submitted that the international nature of cyber money laundering can give 
rise to numerous problems involving confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds 
of crime, especially where these proceeds are located in the intangible world of 
                                                 
5 Jaarsveld (2004: 698). 
6 See Brenner (2006: 189). 
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the internet. The recommendations of the FATF merely set out minimum 
standards with which member states must comply. These require countries to 
adopt legislative measures relating to confiscation but do not delve into 
technicalities which may arise during the physical confiscation process. It merely 
is required that countries do not interfere with the rights of bona fide third parties. 
 
Following the digital trail of cyber money laundering offences always will be a 
great challenge. This necessitates high degrees of communication between 
countries and rapid responses in order to preserve digital evidence. 
Unfortunately, the framework of treaties and other arrangements which may form 
the basis for mutual legal assistance is far from ideal.7 Mutual legal assistance 
also may involve high costs and this burden is placed mostly on the party 
providing such assistance.8 
 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
Since cyber money laundering is a relatively new concept, there is no real 
authority on the issue of jurisdiction over cyber money laundering. Where 
authors have considered jurisdiction the focus has been on jurisdiction over 
cyber crimes in general.9 Authors tend to build on the content of international 
conventions, not delving into the complexities of jurisdictional issues relating to 
the crime of cyber money laundering.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Grabosky (2007: 217). 
8 Grabosky (2007: 217). 
9 See, for example, Brenner & Koops. 
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Bachus has concluded that cyber money laundering does simplify and 
accelerate the process of money laundering.10 However, her research in this field 
has focused primarily on the financing of terrorism through money laundering, in 
response to the events which occurred in America on 11 September 2001. 
 
Brenner is probably the most authoritative writer on the issue of jurisdiction over 
cyber crimes, a topic which is of paramount relevance to the question of 
jurisdiction of cyber money laundering. With regard to the issue of conflicting 
jurisdictions, Brenner is of the opinion that in such cases the claims of each state 
should be prioritised.11 However, the question of how states would go about 
prioritising conflicting claims over cyber money laundering remains unresolved.12  
 
According to Clark, since international law has not yet resolved the issue of 
prioritising claims, the solution traditionally has been negotiation between 
states.13 For Brenner the response to this is a list of factors which should be 
taken into consideration when determining jurisdiction over cyber money 
laundering. He submits that territory remains the main factor for determining 
whether a sovereign state has jurisdiction over a crime. Often treaties and 
statutes declare that a state has jurisdiction when the crime has been committed 
in the territory of a sovereign state.14 According to Brenner, modern jurisdictional 
provisions expand these laws to include nationality and conduct which has an 
effect, or is intended to have an effect, in a sovereign state.15   
 
                                                 
10 Bachus (2004: 835). 
11 Brenner (2006: 197). 
12 Brenner (2006: 207). 
13 Clark (2004: 180). 
14 Brenner (2006: 196). 
15 Brenner (2006: 193). 
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1.3 Research Questions 
Since cyber money laundering entails the use of modern technology, the 
physical aspects related to the internet and its usage will be researched in the 
light of the problem of jurisdiction over cyber money laundering. Certain technical 
and legal aspects involved with internet transactions will be researched. For 
example, does the location of internet servers have a role in determining 
jurisdiction over the crime of cyber money laundering and will this have an 
impact on who has jurisdiction to prosecute the crime of cyber money 
laundering? 
 
Cyber money laundering renders geographical borders between states more or 
less irrelevant. Digital money can be transferred literally from one end of the 
world to the other in an instant. With this it becomes evident that the jurisdictions 
of several states may be applicable in a single case of cyber money laundering. 
Although the digital money used in cyber money laundering originated from a 
specific geographical region (or several), it is clear that it has the potential to 
affect the interests of a large number of states. How will this affect the rights of 
states in claiming jurisdiction over the crime of cyber money laundering? More 
specifically, how would those responsible for combating cyber money laundering 
approach the problem of states which have conflicting interests in the 
prosecution of cyber money laundering and the confiscation and forfeiture of its 
proceeds? 
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1.4 Significance of the Research 
Money laundering is bad for business, development, the economy and the rule of 
law.16 As cyber money laundering is a relatively new and advanced form of 
criminal activity, research into the problematic areas which arise during the 
investigation, prosecution and determination of jurisdiction over the crime of 
cyber money laundering is necessary. 
 
By identifying techniques which are used to achieve cyber money laundering and 
the institutions which are most vulnerable, the research can serve a preventive 
function and assist in the overall battle against cyber money laundering.  
 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
This research will be conducted using a desktop approach. Both primary and 
secondary sources will be used to conduct the research. Accordingly, a range of 
international treaties, statutes, books, journals, cases and internet sources will 
be consulted. 
 
 
1.6 Key Words 
Cyber Money Laundering, Internet, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Digital 
Money, Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), 
Placement, Layering, Integration, Customer Due Diligence. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16  Alweendo (2005: 3) and Bachus (2004: 838). 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CONCEPT OF CYBER MONEY LAUNDERING 
 
2.1 Basic Concept of Money Laundering on the Internet 
Since cyber money laundering essentially consists of money laundering which is 
conducted over the internet, a brief examination of the concept of money 
laundering is necessary. Money laundering always will involve the disguising of 
money, derived from criminal origins, so that said money may appear legitimate. 
Incorporated into this narrow definition of money laundering is the fact that all 
money launderers have three objectives in common. They all wish to conceal the 
origin and ownership of the illegally obtained money, maintain control over it and 
change its form.17 These steps are essential in the crime of money laundering, 
since it is only by these means that a money launderer can launder money 
successfully. 
 
The concept of cyber money laundering also cannot be explained without 
reference to the broader concept of cyber crime. Although cyber crime is a 
relatively new legal phenomenon, it is simply a new method of committing crimes 
which have been in existence for ages.18 Unlike the traditional concept of crime, 
cyber crimes are not physically grounded.19 However, the term 'cyber crime' itself 
causes great difficulty for some authors. Thus, 'cyber crimes', 'computer crimes' 
or even 'IT crimes' could be synonyms or they could refer to different concepts.20  
 
 
                                                 
17 Jaarsveld (2004: 687). 
18 McCusker (2007: 258). 
19 Brenner (2006: 190). 
20 McCusker (2007: 258). 
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It is exactly for this reason that the term 'cyber crime' has been understood to 
encompass any form of unlawful conduct on the internet.21 Since the crime of 
cyber money laundering would fall easily into this category, it is safe to conclude 
that cyber money laundering is a subset of cybercrime.  
 
In the past, money laundering was a physical process and required the launderer 
to transport physically cash which was obtained from illegal sources.22 Due to 
advancements in technology and the establishment of the internet, this is no 
longer required. Since they provide better access to information and financial 
services, the features of the internet make it a perfect tool for the facilitation of 
money laundering.23 Such features include the speed and ease of transactions, 
the relative or total anonymity of the parties and the capacity to traverse multiple 
jurisdictions in mere seconds.24 Globalisation not only facilitated the international 
laundering of money, but also allowed for international co-operation and the 
establishment of transnational bodies to combat money laundering.25 
 
 
2.2 Importance of Prevention 
It has been argued that the efforts against money laundering by anti-money 
laundering authorities should be terminated.26 Advocates of this idea contend 
that the stringent policies that these agencies impose on financial institutions 
undermine the economic well-being of certain countries.27 They argue that the 
anti-money laundering obligations placed on financial institutions lead to an 
                                                 
21 McCusker (2007: 258). 
22 Bortner (1996: 1). 
23 Jaarsveld (2004: 691) and Kellerman (2004: 1). 
24 Jaarsveld (2004: 692) and Kellerman (2004: 3). 
25 Pieth (2002: 8) and Shehu (2000: 2). 
26 Stessens (2000: 165) and Rahn (2002: 149). 
27 Rahn (2002: 153). 
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increased administrative burden on these institutions.28 This holds true especially 
for smaller countries which base their financial sectors on financial secrecy.29  
 
However, this view cannot be sustained. Money laundering has negative 
implications for national income and output, fiscal policies, exchange rates and 
the terms of international trade.30 It has been shown that money laundering 
causes national market-orientated exchange rates to depreciate.31 This, in turn, 
leads to an increase in the price of imports and a decrease in the price of 
exports. Simply put, the country will find itself in a weaker economic position than 
it was without money laundering. It has been shown also that criminally-obtained 
money is used to finance international terrorism and this fact strains international 
relationships.32 Although it is true that laundered money eventually returns to the 
country of origin, the long-term effects of money laundering outweigh the short-
term benefits of a cash influx into an economy.33  
 
There are four major consequences of money laundering.34 Firstly, money 
laundering allows criminals to profit from their criminal activities and creates 
funding for future criminal activities.35 Removing the financial incentive for 
criminals to commit such crimes is a key element in the overall fight against 
crime. In addition, investigating instances of money laundering sometimes may 
be the only way of retrieving or returning stolen money to victims.36 
 
                                                 
28 Stessens (2000: 165). 
29 Jaarsveld (2004: 688). 
30 Bartlett (2002: 1). 
31 Bartlett (2002: 1) and Jaarsveld (2004: 688). 
32 Jaarsveld (2004: 688). 
33 Bachus (2004: 838).  
34 Alweendo (2005: 3), Bachus (2004: 838) and Jaarsveld (2004: 688). 
35 Bachus (2004: 838) and Jaarsveld (2004: 688). 
36 Bachus (2004: 838). 
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Secondly, money laundering is considered to be bad for business.37 Most 
financial institutions and businesses rely on their good reputations in order to 
build future business relationships. In all economies, businesses require a free 
and competitive market in order to survive. The effects of money laundering 
undermine such a free and competitive market structure.38 
 
Thirdly, it has been argued that money laundering is bad for the economic 
growth of developing countries.39 Such countries tend to rely on secrecy to 
develop a strong financial sector.40 However, this secrecy hinders the detection 
and prosecution of money laundering activities within such countries.41 This, in 
turn, leads to social instability and ultimately impedes lawful commercial 
development.42 While illegal funds injected into a developing country may seem 
to be a fast way for that country to build wealth, in the long run it imposes heavy 
burdens on the world economy by harming effective economic activity.43 
Businesses will be reluctant to invest in countries which are subject to such 
unstable dealings.44 
 
Lastly, money laundering is bad for global and national economies.45 Since the 
globalisation of the world's economy, the wealth of each country affects the well-
being of all other countries.46  
 
 
                                                 
37 Alweendo (2005: 3) and Bachus (2004: 838).  
38 Bachus (2004: 839). 
39 Bachus (2004: 839) and Jaarsveld (2004: 688). 
40 Jaarsveld (2004: 688). 
41 Bachus (2004: 840). 
42 Bachus (2004: 840) and Jaarsveld (2004: 688). 
43 Jaarsveld (2004: 688). 
44 Bachus (2004: 840). 
45 Bachus (2004: 840). 
46 Bachus (2004: 840). 
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Every year enormous amounts of money are spent in the fight against money 
laundering, which money could have been spent better had money laundering 
not existed.47 Money laundering also promotes distrust in the financial sector, 
which has a negative impact on the economic growth of a country.48 
 
 
2.3 Role of the Internet in Placement, Layering and Integration 
The internet has been described as 'a virtual geography created by computers 
and networks, and includes invisible and intangible paths constructed through 
the space continuum'.49 The most basic explanation of the internet is that it is 
comprised of a global network of computers that all speak the same language. A 
network is a group of computers connected to one another, enabling them to 
share information accurately. A part of the internet is the World Wide Web, which 
was created initially to help physicists keep track of data of colleagues in similar 
fields of expertise.50  
 
In the light of modern financial transactions, banks use electronic funds transfers 
(EFTs) through telecommunication links via bank computers.51 Banks are 
connected to one another through a computer messaging system that is 
operated by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
(SWIFT).52 As EFTs are of vital importance to a money launderer, it is crucial to 
distinguish between the concept of digital cash and EFTs.53  
 
                                                 
47 Bachus (2004: 840). 
48 Jaarsveld (2004: 688). 
49 Jaarsveld (2004: 694). 
50 Jaarsveld (2004: 691). 
51 Panurach (1996: 46). 
52 SWIFT homepage. 
53 Jaarsveld (2004: 692). 
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A typical example of digital cash is stored value cards, such as credit cards or 
automatic teller machine cards.54 Electronic money or digital cash exists outside 
of ordinary banks, has no physical presence and, as such, can be manipulated 
through any computer anywhere in the world.55 Account holders can gain access 
to their accounts indirectly from any computer which has internet access, and in 
such event financial institutions have no way of verifying the true identity of their 
customers. 
 
EFTs or wire transfers are electronic transactions carried out by an originator 
through a financial institution with the aim of making money available to a 
beneficiary.56 EFTs are brought about by instructions from the originator.57 
Sometimes the beneficiary and the originator may be the same person, if such 
person has numerous accounts and simply transfers money from one account to 
another.  
 
Regardless of the form it takes, money laundering always involves three 
stages.58 The first stage of money laundering is referred to as the placement 
stage.59 This would involve the placement of money obtained from illegal origins 
into cyberspace (more commonly known as the internet).60 The main advantage 
of the internet here is the use of Electronic money (E-money), which is digital 
money that can be exchanged freely over the internet without the use of an 
intermediary.61  
 
                                                 
54 Fera (1996: 2). 
55 Jaarsveld (2004: 693). 
56 Jaarsveld (2004: 692). 
57 Jaarsveld (2004: 692). 
58 Bachus (2004: 842) and Philippsohn (2001: 3). 
59 Philippsohn (2001: 3). 
60 Jaarsveld (2004: 695). 
61 Philippsohn (2001: 3). 
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Intermediaries are sometimes subject to certain reporting requirements 
pertaining to transactions of a suspicious nature. Thus, the FATF requires, 
among others, financial institutions to report transactions which they suspect or 
have reasonable grounds to suspect involve funds that are the proceeds of 
criminal activities.62 When the proceeds of crime are in the form of E-money, 
they could be used to buy goods or foreign exchange over the internet, to be 
resold at a later stage. This transaction simultaneously will enjoy a very high 
degree of anonymity.63 E-money thus could be used to place dirty money without 
having to conduct face-to-face transactions.  
 
Secondly, in the layering stage, the money launderer undertakes a series of 
transactions in order to separate the money from its illegal origins.64 This 
process may include the purchase of goods or merely the transfer of money to 
different accounts. It is submitted that it is during this stage of the money 
laundering process that the internet could be of most use to money launderers. 
Since the internet makes it possible for transactions to be done instantaneously, 
the money launderer can build up quickly an extensive audit trail with relative 
ease.65  
 
Lastly, during the integration stage, the money must be used by the launderer, 
ensuring that it appears as his own legitimate wealth.66 The launderer could use 
a fictitious online business which allegedly provides services. In return for these 
services, the company receives payment from money which has passed through 
the layering process. At the same time, the money which has travelled through 
                                                 
62 FATF Recommendation 13. 
63 Philippsohn (2001: 3). 
64 Bachus (2004: 844). 
65 Philippsohn (2001: 3). 
66 Bachus (2004: 844). 
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the layering process may be in the name of a fictitious person, even further 
hindering the prosecution of the crime. Effectively, the wealth of the owner of the 
company would appear to be legitimate income of the company.67 This process 
is illustrated well by the following diagram, adapted from Phillipsohn:68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 Philippsohn (2001: 4). 
68 Philippsohn (2001: 4). 
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2.4 Methods of Cyber Money Laundering 
As may be expected, there are numerous methods through which the crime of 
cyber money laundering could be committed. They range from the mere misuse 
of online banks and casinos to more complicated criminal techniques which take 
advantage of jurisdictional differences among countries. Generally, the methods 
of the crime are categorised under direct or indirect acts of cyber money 
laundering.  
 
Cyber money laundering is direct when an individual directly deals with a 
financial institution while simultaneously hiding his true intentions.69 The 
following is a list of methods through which direct cyber money laundering could 
be achieved over the internet: 
1. Concealment within business structures; 
2. Misuse of legitimate businesses; 
3. Use of false identities, documents and ‘smurfs’; 
4. Exploitation of international jurisdictional issues; and 
5. Use of anonymous asset types.70  
 
However, cyber money laundering can be committed indirectly also. This form of 
cyber money laundering is achieved by avoiding direct dealings with financial 
institutions.71 The Hawala system has been a traditional method of facilitating the 
transfer of funds between Europe and South Asia. In this system, funds are 
simply moved between those launderers who distribute them at one end of the 
cycle and those who collect them at the other end.72 
                                                 
69   The Egmont Group (1999: 88). 
70   The Egmont Group (1999: 88). 
71   The Egmont Group (1999: 88). 
72 Jaarsveld (2004: 693). 
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In its most basic form, Hawala has been described as ‘money transfer without 
money movement’.73 However, the Hawala system operates on a strong tradition 
of reliance and trust between parties, which makes it almost impossible to 
penetrate.74 The participants are also notorious for their lack of record keeping 
and where records are kept, they are probably encoded.75 With the Hawala 
system, funds are moved between countries in an informal manner. 
 
Upon a customer request, a Hawala operator in one country simply would e-mail 
his hawaladar associate in another country with the specifics of the transaction. 
As no names are used in Hawala transactions, correspondence would consist 
merely of a specified amount with a corresponding password. Once the 
hawaladar associate receives the password from a recipient, he simply would 
pay the specified amount out of his own funds in local currency.76 
 
By using the Hawala system, a cyber money launderer would avoid possible 
reporting (of certain transactions) by financial institutions to financial agencies. In 
fact, it has been shown that these money or value transfer services have been 
subjected to abuse by cyber money launderers.77 These services facilitate 
anonymous funds transfers and as a result few or no records are kept.78 These 
services are commonly referred to as underground banking systems, of which 
Hawala is the classic example.79 
 
 
                                                 
73 Bowers (2009: 379). 
74 Jaarsveld (2004: 693). 
75 Jaarsveld (2004: 693). 
76 Bowers (2009: 379). 
77 FATF (2003: 2). 
78 Bowers (2009: 379). 
79 Jaarsveld (2004: 693). 
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Indirect cyber money laundering could be achieved using the following methods: 
1. E-Cash; 
2. Online Auctions; 
3. Bankruptcy Frauds; 
4. Cyber Terrorism; 
5. Online Banking and Fraudulent Credit Cards; 
6. E-gold; and 
7. Online Casinos.80 
 
While online banking has become more attractive to everyday consumers 
because of the convenience it offers, unfortunately it also has become an 
attractive avenue for cyber criminals wishing to launder money. Online banks are 
thus extremely vulnerable institutions in the context of cyber money laundering. 
The low identification and reporting requirements of some online banks serve 
only to make them more susceptible to being used in the cyber money 
laundering process. Online banks also have to deal with a higher number of 
transactions than ordinary banks.81 As a result, it becomes much more difficult 
for online banks to identify suspicious transactions. Cyber money launderers are 
capable of using multiple individuals and accounts in order to create extensive 
trails aimed at hindering investigation of their activities. This process is referred 
to often as 'smurfing'. 
 
During the layering phase of money laundering, the money undergoes a series 
of transactions in order to separate it from its illegal origins.82 Essentially, the 
purpose of layering is to ensure that authorities are incapable of identifying the 
                                                 
80   Kochan (2006: 112). 
81 Philippsohn (2001: 3). 
82 Philippsohn (2001: 3). 
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fact that the money originated from illegal sources. One of the ways of achieving 
this is through the use of 'smurfs'. These 'smurfs' are individuals used by the 
cyber money launderer to facilitate the layering phase of the laundering process. 
In exchange for a small fee, these individuals each will conduct certain 
transactions over the internet upon the instructions of the cyber money 
launderer. In this way, the cyber money launderer can complicate further the 
investigation of his illegal activities. By using 'smurfs', the cyber money launderer 
also can avoid certain reporting requirements of financial and other institutions. It 
is obvious that a single large transaction by one individual is much more likely to 
be reported as suspicious than multiple small transactions by seemingly 
independent individuals. 
 
Individuals who use online banking are capable of accessing their accounts from 
anywhere in the world. This makes it extremely difficult for online banks to verify 
the true identity of their clients.83 Further, money launderers are capable of using 
highly complicated encryption technology to block out law enforcement 
agencies.84 Without the specific key to unlock such encryption, the information 
becomes useless to these agencies. 
 
Unfortunately, the means through which cyber criminals can misuse the internet 
to launder money are almost endless. Where money does not move, as with the 
Hawala system, there are no suspicious transaction reporting requirements.85 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
83 Jaarsveld (2004: 693). 
84 Philippsohn (2001: 1). 
85 Jaarsveld (2004: 694). 
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
3.1 Legal Instruments Applicable to Cyber Money Laundering 
While there are numerous bodies addressing the issue of money laundering, 
none of them addresses the issue of cyber money laundering directly. The same 
applies to the initiatives directed at combating cybercrime. As a result, there is a 
need for law enforcement agencies to utilise the existing initiatives aimed at 
combating both money laundering and cybercrime in order effectively to combat 
cyber money laundering. 
 
 
3.1.1 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and    
mkm Psychotropic Substances 
The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (the Vienna Convention) of 19 December 1988 was 
the first of its kind to acknowledge the problem of money laundering.86 It became 
effective in November 1990 and by 1992 fifty-nine states had ratified the 
Convention.87 Although the term ‘money laundering’ is not used explicitly in the 
Vienna Convention, Article 3 identifies the constituent elements of money 
laundering, which have formed the basis for all subsequent legislation.88 Article 
3(1)(b)(ii) states the following:  
Each Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal 
offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally: ... The concealment or 
disguise of the true nature, source ... with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing 
that such property is derived from an offence or offences established in accordance with 
subparagraph (a) of this paragraph. 
 
                                                 
86 Jaarsveld (2004: 696). 
87 Poremská (2009: 389). 
88 Leong (2007: 150). 
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Article 3(1)(a) refers to a series of offences which are all related to various 
aspects of possession, production and illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances.89 Although confined to drug trafficking, the Vienna 
Convention obliges states to classify money laundering as a criminal offence and 
requires parties to facilitate the identification, tracing and forfeiture of narcotics 
and laundered money.90 
 
Article 4 of the Vienna Convention establishes jurisdiction for money laundering 
offences committed in the territory of a state party by one of its nationals, or 
offences committed outside its territory but which have an effect within its 
territory.  
 
While the Vienna Convention contributed extensively to the international fight 
against narcotics-related money laundering, it remains unclear how effective it 
would be in combating cyber money laundering.91 However, at least the 
Convention contains mandatory provisions relating to jurisdiction, confiscation, 
extradition and mutual legal assistance, which provisions would undeniably 
assist countries in the prosecution of narcotics-related cyber money 
laundering.92 
 
 
3.1.2 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
mkm Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime 
Unlike the Vienna Convention, the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, 
                                                 
89 Article 3(1)(a)(i)-(v) of the Vienna Convention. 
90 Poremská (2009: 389) and article 5 of the Vienna Convention. 
91 Gilmore (1999: 53). 
92 Articles 3, 4, 5 & 6 of the Vienna Convention.  
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Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime is not confined to 
drug trafficking. Its provisions extend to all crimes.93  
 
The crime of cyber money laundering can be inferred from Article 6 of the 
Convention which reads: 
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
establish as offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally:  
(a)  the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is proceeds, for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of  the property or of assisting any 
person who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal 
consequences of his actions; 
(b) the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of, property, knowing that such property is 
proceeds; and, subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal 
system. 
 
As cyber money laundering inevitably would entail the concealment of the origin 
of money obtained by illegal means, the provisions of the Council of Europe 
Convention on Laundering could be used in the fight against cyber money 
laundering. Even though it can be stated comfortably that the drafters of the 
Convention could not have taken into account the possibility of cyber money 
laundering, it remains clear from the provisions of Article 6 that the Convention 
would be applicable to the crime. 
 
Interestingly, the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering does not require 
that the predicate offence of money laundering be subject to the criminal 
jurisdiction of a state party wishing to implement the Convention’s provisions. 94 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
93 Leong (2007: 146). 
94 Article 6(2)(a) of the Council of Europe Convention. 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
3.1.3 First, Second and Third Money Laundering Directives of the European 
mkm Union 
The European Union Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purpose of money laundering (First Money Laundering Directive) 
was implemented on 10 June 1991.95 It was based on the 40 recommendations 
of the FATF and required financial institutions to establish certain identification, 
record-keeping and due diligence measures.96   
 
In addition to this, it obliged financial institutions to report on any suspicious 
transactions.97 Interestingly, Article 8 prohibits the disclosure to a customer that 
an investigation of money laundering is being carried out against him. In the 
case of cyber money laundering, this would be an essential tool in the 
prosecution of the crime. As money launderers in general construct elaborate 
schemes to evade detection by law enforcement agencies, they would go to 
even greater lengths in order to avoid prosecution if they know they are being 
investigated. Here, cyber money launderers are in a unique position due to the 
vulnerabilities involved in digital evidence.98 
 
In 2001 an amendment was made to the First Money Laundering Directive and 
the Second Money Laundering Directive was adopted by the European 
Parliament and the European Union.99 The provisions of the Second Directive 
                                                 
95 Directive 91/308/EEC. 
96 Articles 3, 4, 5 of the first Money Laundering Directive and Leong (2007: 147). 
97 Article 7 of the First Money Laundering Directive. 
98 See Chapter 4. 
99 Directive 2001/97/EC. 
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have a wider scope and extended the anti-money laundering principles to 
lawyers, accountants, auditors, notaries, casinos and estate agents.100 They also 
provided for the establishment in all member states of Financial Intelligence 
Units (FIUs) to which suspicious transactions would be reported.101 
 
The Third Money Laundering Directive was adopted in 2005 and is intended to 
bring the First and Second Money Laundering Directive in line with the FATF 
revised 40 Recommendations of June 2003. It also extends the provisions of the 
directives to any financial transaction which may be linked to the financing of 
terrorism.102  
 
However, the Money Laundering Directives have been challenged on the basis 
that they may interfere with the right to a fair trial. It is argued that the reporting 
requirements of the Directives could interfere materially with a lawyer’s ability to 
represent a client fully and independently.103 In addition, without a report on the 
effectiveness of the Directives, it is unclear whether they actually are fulfilling 
their purpose or whether they simply are placing a money-wasting burden on 
businesses and customers. Unfortunately, the Directives do not contain any 
specific reference to jurisdiction of money laundering offences. 
 
 
 
                                                 
100 Article 1 of the Second Money Laundering Directive and Leong (2007: 147). 
101 Leong (2007: 147). 
102 Leong (2007: 151). 
103 Katz (2007: 208). 
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3.1.4 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime 
The Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime is indispensable in the fight 
against cyber money laundering. The Convention was the result of the work of a 
panel of experts who had to deal with cybercrime, after it was found by the 
European Committee on Crime Problems that cybercrimes are committed 
against the: 
integrity, availability and confidentiality of computer systems and telecommunication 
networks or they consist of the use of such networks or their services to commit 
traditional offences.104  
 
Although the Convention on Cybercrime does not mention money laundering 
directly as a cybercrime, it does indirectly allow authorities to pursue it as 
crime.105 As cyber money laundering is conducted over the internet, this makes 
sense.  
 
The Convention on Cybercrime aims at creating an effective legal framework 
which is based on harmonisation of legal frameworks between member states 
and the provision of laws and procedures for the effective prosecution of 
cybercrimes.106  
 
Article 1 of the Convention defines a computer system as: 
any device or a group of interconnected or related devices, one or more of which, 
pursuant to a program, performs automatic processing of data. 
 
Article 2 of the Convention requires states parties to: 
adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal 
offences under its domestic law ... the access to the whole or any part of a computer 
system without right. A Party may require that the offence be committed by infringing 
security measures, with the intent of obtaining computer data or other dishonest intent, or 
in relation to a computer system that is connected to another computer system. 
                                                 
104 The European Convention on Cybercrime Explanatory Report No. 9. 
105 Jaarsveld (2004: 696). 
106 Lovet (2009: 68). 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
The use of the words ‘or other dishonest intent’ makes it clear that this 
Convention could be applicable indirectly to the act of cyber money laundering. In 
addition to this, the Convention deals with illegal access to and interception of 
computer systems and the misuse of devices in the performance of criminal 
activities.107 
 
The procedural methods established by the Convention on Cybercrime are also 
of significance to cyber money laundering. The Convention requires states 
parties to adopt legislative and other measures which would enable them to 
procure information from individuals and service providers within their territory 
who are suspected of committing a cybercrime.108 However, this authority is 
subject to certain limitations to ensure the fair administration of justice.109 
 
In the fight against cybercrime much emphasis is placed on international co-
operation. Accordingly, the Convention on Cybercrime devotes an entire chapter 
to this.110 More specifically, its provisions cover general principles relating to 
international co-operation and extradition, as well as general principles of mutual 
legal assistance and procedures pertaining to mutual legal assistance.111 The 
Convention also deals with mutual legal assistance in specific cases relating to 
access to stored computer data, the collection of real-time traffic data (such as 
the internet) and the interception of content data.112  
 
 
                                                 
107 Articles 3-13 of the Convention on Cybercrime. 
108 Article 18 of the Convention on Cybercrime. 
109 Articles 14 & 15 of the Convention on Cybercrime. 
110 Chapter 3 of the Convention on Cybercrime. 
111 Articles 23-27 of the Convention on Cybercrime. 
112 Articles 31,33 & 34 of the Convention on Cybercrime. 
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Archick argues that the Convention does take a significant step forward in 
addressing cybercrime as it forces member states to prosecute computer-related 
crimes vigorously. By mandating sanctions and making it possible to extradite 
perpetrators, the Convention enhances deterrence and reduces the number of 
safe havens for criminals. In addition to this, the provisions relating to the 
collection of evidence will assist law enforcement agencies in the fight against 
terrorism.113  
 
However, Lewis argues that the Convention is critically unbalanced, allowing for 
sweeping powers of computer search and seizure without corresponding 
protection of privacy rights. Giving too many powers to investigating authorities 
could lead to an infringement of the right of free expression on the internet. The 
costs associated with data-preservation requirements could hinder business and 
the Convention could force businesses to reshape themselves in favour of law 
enforcement agencies.114  
 
Archick thinks that the Convention requires more member states in order to be 
effective.  After all, the states which are members of the Convention are not the 
problem. Cyber criminals would simply route their attacks through countries 
which are not members of the Convention, for example, North Korea.115 He notes 
also that the Convention does not allow police authorities direct cross-border 
access to computer data, which creates an unnecessary time-wasting step.116 
Also, he is concerned that the Convention lacks a dual criminality provision, 
making it possible for one country to request another country to investigate a 
                                                 
113 Archick (2006: 3). 
114 Lewis (2004: 2). 
115 Archick (2006: 3). 
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matter without it being a crime under the latter’s domestic law.117 
 
Although the Convention was drafted in 2001, its provisions still seem applicable 
today. However, given the rapid growth of cybercrime and the excellent 
profitability it offers to a criminal, the Convention still faces major obstacles. Due 
to the numerous provisions which have to be incorporated into a state party’s 
domestic legal system, the process of ratification takes a long time.118  
 
 
3.2 International Institutions Dealing with Cyber Money Laundering 
There are various international institutions involved in the fight against money 
laundering. These range from relatively small private institutions to larger public 
initiatives aimed at creating soft law in order to assist countries in combating 
money laundering. 
 
3.2.1 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Regulation 
The Basel Committee is an institution which was established in 1974 by the 
central bank governors of a group of ten nations. It formulates broad supervisory 
standards and guidelines of best practice in banking supervision, in the hope that 
other nations will take steps to implement them in their national systems.119 Its 
primary purpose is to encourage common approaches and standards within 
banking supervision.120 As one author has noted:  
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is not a classical multilateral organisation. It 
has no founding treaty, and it does not issue binding regulations. Rather, its main function 
is to act as an informal forum to find policy solutions and to promulgate standards.121  
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118 Lovet (2009: 69). 
119 Leong (2007: 153). 
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In December 1988, the Basel Committee adopted the Statement of Principles 
concerning money laundering. Although the Statement was not enforceable, the 
participating states decided to follow the principles in accordance with their 
national legal regulations. The Statement of Principles makes efforts to identify 
customers and to refuse business with customers who fail to provide adequate 
identification. In addition, it urges banks to co-operate with law enforcement 
authorities.122 Similar to the Wolfsberg Group, the Basel Committee emphasises 
the importance of enhanced information sharing.123  
 
 
3.2.2 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
The FATF is an inter-governmental body established for the sole purpose of 
creating anti-laundering strategies based on international co-operation. It was 
established as early as 1989 and has proved to be invaluable in the fight against 
money laundering. As combating money laundering is its sole purpose, the FATF 
has managed to keep abreast of the latest developments in money 
laundering.124 It has formulated 40 Recommendations and 9 Special 
Recommendations (on terrorist financing), all aimed at combating money 
laundering.  
 
Relevant to cyber money laundering is the fact that banks and other financial 
institutions are advised not to keep anonymous accounts and to verify the 
existence of their customers. In addition, banks and financial institutions are 
advised to take reasonable measures to establish the true identity of their 
                                                 
122 Poremská (2009: 389). 
123 Leong (2007: 153). 
124 Jaarsveld (2004: 697). 
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customers.125 While Recommendations 6 and 7 of the 9 Special 
Recommendations on terrorist financing make no specific reference to cyber 
money laundering, they are directly applicable to the crime.126  
 
Special Recommendation 6 deals with the issue of 'Alternative Remittance' or, as 
explored in Chapter 2 above, the underground banking systems. Here the FATF 
requires member states to take measures against any persons (including legal 
persons) who provide a service for the transmission of money or value.127  
 
Regardless of whether such service is provided formally or informally, the service 
providers should be licensed, registered and subject to all FATF requirements 
which apply to banks and non-banking institutions.128 Lastly, if such service 
providers carry out this service illegally, countries should ensure that they are 
subject to administrative, civil or criminal sanctions.129 From this it is clear that 
the FATF realised the possibility of cyber money laundering occurring through, 
for example, the Hawala system. 
 
Special Recommendation 7 deals with the issue of wire transfers. The previous 
chapter demonstrated how easily wire transfers (basically, electronic funds 
transfers) could be used to facilitate cyber money laundering. As a result, the 
FATF obligates countries to take measures to require financial institutions to 
include accurate and meaningful originator information on funds transfers. In 
addition, these financial institutions must be required by their respective 
countries to conduct enhanced scrutiny of funds transfers which do not contain 
                                                 
125 Jaarsveld (2004: 698). 
126 Jaarsveld (2004: 698). 
127 FATF Special Recommendation 6. 
128 FATF Special Recommendation 6. 
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complete originator information. This information must include the name, 
address and account number of the originator.130 This recommendation was 
included primarily to preclude criminals from having free access to wire 
transfers.131  
 
 
3.2.3 The Wolsfberg Group 
The Wolfsberg Group is an association of global banks which aims to develop 
financial services industry standards.132 Most of the existing initiatives in the fight 
against money laundering have been led by the public sector. However, the 
Wolfsberg Principles have been developed by the private sector. In 2000, eleven 
banks signed a set of principles known as the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering 
Principles. These principles are a non-binding set of best practice guidelines 
regarding the maintenance of relationships between private bankers and their 
clients.133 More specifically, they focus on Know Your Customer (KYC), anti-
money laundering and counter-terrorist financing policies.134 
 
The Group came together in 2000, in the company of representatives of 
Transparency International, to work on drafting anti-money laundering guidelines 
for private banking. These principles were published in October 2000 and were 
then revised in 2002. In November 2002, the Group published the Wolfsberg 
Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Correspondent Banking.135 Then, in 2004 
the Group focused on the development of a due diligence model for financial 
                                                 
130 FATF Special Recommendation 7. 
131 Jaarsveld (2004: 698). 
132  Aiolfi (2006: 4). 
133  Hinterseer (2001: 25). 
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institutions. Through globalisation, financial markets have become more 
international and integrated in operation.136 Because money laundering takes 
advantage of possible weaknesses in the regulation of financial services, it 
necessitates a comprehensive and flexible approach.  
 
Attempts to solve this problem have seen much of the regulatory burden being 
passed on to banks themselves to regulate possible money laundering by their 
clients.137 The Wolfsberg Principles represent the collective initiatives of several 
prominent participants in financial markets and have the potential to become a 
set of industry standards for banks.138 It is worth noting that of the eleven banks 
that participated in formulating the Wolfsberg Principles, most have been 
associated with a money laundering scandal in one way or another.139  
 
As with most of the other initiatives aimed at fighting money laundering, the 
Wolfsberg Principles do not make reference specifically to cyber money 
laundering. However, it must be remembered that cyber money laundering is a 
relatively new concept and is (at most) a different technique to achieve the 
traditional goals of money laundering. As a result, the Wolfsberg Principles 
remain a viable tool that can be used by private banks to prevent money 
laundering in general. After all, the primary purpose of the Wolfsberg Principles 
is to ensure that the services offered by the banks and their international 
dealings are not abused for criminal purposes. Further, this can be achieved only 
by accepting clients whose wealth can be reasonably established as 
                                                 
136 Hinterseer (2001: 25). 
137 Hinterseer (2001: 25). 
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legitimate.140 
 
The Wolfsberg Principles correspond to a great extent with the 
Recommendations of the FATF and their KYC and customer due diligence 
(CDD) initiatives. The Principles cater specifically for private banking and include 
extensive guidelines for banks to follow in the identification of clients and the 
requirements of the CDD process.141  
 
In addition, the Principles cover situations that require further due diligence and 
attention, practices that are associated with identifying suspicious transactions, 
monitoring programmes, educational measures, and the establishment of an 
anti-money laundering organisation within each bank.142 
 
Primarily the Wolfsberg Principles attempt to convince national and international 
agencies to adopt a risk-based approach to anti-money laundering law. In the 
words of Pieth: 
Whereas the traditional rule-based approach was rather ineffective, because it asked 
banks to take specific measures depending on set thresholds or predefined criteria, the 
risk-based approach is more flexible, it identifies risk variables ... but leaves it up to the 
institution to set its own priorities for each criterion.143 
 
According to this approach, each institution is required to develop its own 
compliance system which allows for a greater margin of flexibility.144 
 
The challenges confronted by authorities in financial markets increase with the 
growth and liberalisation of banks.145 This problem is exaggerated by the speed 
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and large geographic scope of cyber money laundering. The simple fact that 
banks have increased substantially their international activities in the last decade 
necessitates the actions taken by international bodies to prevent money 
laundering. If these actions against money laundering in general are not taken, 
there would be no platform for regulators to build their initiatives against cyber 
money laundering. In this regard, the Wolfsberg Principles would be invaluable in 
the fight against cyber money laundering. At the very least, this would hold true 
for the banking sector which, arguably, would feature large in cyber money 
laundering activities.  
 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
The international community has acted on many fronts in its response to money 
laundering and emphasis has been placed on promoting international co-
operation and the establishment of an effective international anti-money 
laundering regime.146 However, the various obligations placed on countries to 
fight money laundering still vary according to their degree of adherence to the 
relevant anti-money laundering instruments.147 This creates severe problems for 
the prosecution of cyber money laundering as the crime is mostly transnational 
in nature. For this reason, it is crucial for countries to present a unified front in 
order effectively to combat cyber money laundering. 
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CHAPTER 4 
JURISDICTION OVER CYBER MONEY LAUNDERING 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Jurisdiction is defined in the Oxford Dictionary of Law as ‘the power of a court to 
hear and decide a case or make a certain order or the territorial limits within 
which the jurisdiction of a court may be exercised’.148 Broadly speaking, the 
concept of jurisdiction encompasses three elements. It entails a state’s right to 
prescribe certain laws to its citizens or in the interest of its citizens, to adjudicate 
or decide whether such laws have been violated, and to enforce compliance or 
punish non-compliance with those laws.149  
 
 
4.2 Local and Transnational Cybercrime 
When determining how existing principles of jurisdiction could be applied to 
cyber money laundering, one must differentiate between two types of 
cybercrime: local cybercrime and transnational cybercrime.150  
 
Local cybercrime occurs entirely within the geographical area of one sovereign 
state and does not necessarily entail jurisdictional difficulties.151 In the case of 
local cybercrime, a money launderer would use the internet to facilitate the 
placement, layering or integration phases of money laundering, but the entire 
process occurs within the jurisdiction of one state.152  
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Use of the internet means that signals invariably would be transmitted into and 
out of the sovereign state’s jurisdiction. However, this would be merely incidental 
to the crime and would not affect materially the prosecution thereof.153 As a 
result, regulatory authorities effectively would be able to use existing anti-money 
laundering legislation to prosecute the crime of cyber money laundering. The 
mere fact that a cyber money launderer uses the internet in the process of 
laundering money would not preclude the application of traditional jurisdictional 
principles.154 
 
Transnational cybercrime occurs across several states and, as a result, the 
elements of the crime are scattered among different jurisdictions.155 This 
complicates both the investigation and the prosecution of the crime.156 After all, 
this is one of the reasons why cyber money launderers find the internet useful 
during the money laundering process. A state would be able to claim jurisdiction 
either because a part of the crime was committed within territory of the state or 
because the effects of the crime were felt within that state. Here the problem is 
to identify whether the crime actually was committed within the state or whether 
the effects of the crime were felt there. As technology has advanced, cyber 
money launderers are able to encrypt their transmissions of data over the 
internet so that their actions are virtually untraceable. However, a detailed 
explanation of the intricacies of modern technology and how it can be abused for 
criminal purposes goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Traditionally, jurisdiction is based on the concept of territory.157 However, modern 
statutes and treaties expand on this and include principles of nationality and 
effect.158 According to the territoriality principle, states can assert jurisdiction over 
conduct occurring within their territorial boundaries. While the vast majority of 
criminals commit their crimes within the territory of one sovereign state, the 
same cannot be said of cyber money laundering. Apart from the territoriality 
principle, states can assert jurisdiction also according to the nationality principle. 
According to this principle, states can assert jurisdiction over their citizens as 
perpetrators, regardless of where the alleged offence occurred. States may also 
assert their jurisdiction over perpetrators within their territorial borders under the 
effects principle if criminal behaviour affects a national interest.159 
 
As previously emphasised, cyber money laundering increases geographic 
mobility and the use of telecommunications undermines the traditional models of 
jurisdiction. It also becomes possible for a perpetrator to commit a crime within 
another country without physically leaving his own.160 Jurisdiction is, therefore, 
no longer determined solely according to the requirement that the perpetrator be 
physically present within a country at the time the offence was committed.161 
Under the modern conception of jurisdiction, a country has jurisdiction to 
prescribe its laws with regard to any of the following: conduct which, wholly or 
substantially, takes place within its territory; the status of persons, or interests in 
things, present within its territory; conduct outside its territory which has or is 
intended to have a substantial effect within its territory; and the activities of its 
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nationals outside (as well as within) its territory. 162 
 
 
4.2.1 Location of Acts 
Article 22(1) of the Convention on Cybercrime uses the territoriality principle as 
the primary factor constituting jurisdiction. It reads as follows:  
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to 
establish jurisdiction over any offence established in accordance with Articles 2 through 
11 of this Convention, when the offence is committed:  
  a   in its territory; or  
  b   on board a ship flying the flag of that Party; or  
  c   on board an aircraft registered under the laws of that Party; or 
  d   by one of its nationals, if the offence is punishable under criminal law where it was      
h     committed or if the offence is committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any  g   g 
f      State. 
 
However, using the territoriality principle to justify jurisdiction over a crime is not 
a simple undertaking when the crime is committed over the internet.163 This fact 
is complicated further by different approaches taken when countries determine 
jurisdiction over cybercrimes. Thus, courts likely will use various modes to 
determine whether they have jurisdiction or not. As one source has noted:  
One of the issues, therefore, that requires further study is to survey the factors courts will 
use to determine the location of the act of a cybercrime.164 
 
 
4.2.1.1 Effects Doctrine 
It is common for states to exercise jurisdiction over conduct which occurred 
outside their territorial bounds but which has a harmful effect, or is intended to 
have a harmful effect, within their territory.165 According to the effects doctrine, 
states can claim jurisdiction even where the effect of a crime is not a constituent 
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element of the crime.166 While the doctrine is accepted widely in the USA, it is 
criticised severely in Europe.167   
 
Be that as it may, the doctrine remains a prime ground upon which states can 
found their jurisdiction over a crime of cyber money laundering. However, 
countries will experience difficulties in proving whether an act of cyber money 
laundering had a material effect on them. This will be the case, for example, 
when an act of cyber money laundering was routed through a country because 
of low supervision requirements in that particular country. International law 
requires a sufficiently close connection with an offence before a state may claim 
jurisdiction over such offence.168 Where cyber money launderers simply route 
their attacks through a country, without any negative impact on that particular 
country, it is doubtful whether such country would have sufficient grounds on 
which to prosecute the crime. 
 
 
4.2.1.2 Ubiquity Theory 
According to this theory: 
an offence is deemed to have taken place on the territory of a state as soon as a 
constituent or essential element of this offence has taken place on that territory.169 
 
While this theory is popular in the USA and has been adopted informally into 
English law, it is more stringent than the effects doctrine as a state can claim 
jurisdiction only if the effect of the offence constituted an essential element of the 
crime. However, money laundering has been described as a conduct offence, 
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and as such, the effects of money laundering cannot be said to be an essential 
element of the crime.170 Regardless of this, it is still argued that states will be 
able to claim jurisdiction under the ubiquity theory due to the broad scope of 
most money laundering incriminations. Stessens has noted the following in this 
regard: 
Whenever one transaction takes place on the territory of a state, even if the broader 
money laundering scheme is located abroad, that state will be able to try the money 
laundering offence. Whereas in some jurisdictions, courts tend to amalgamate all 
money laundering offences constituting one money laundering scheme (e.g. in 
Belgium), in other jurisdictions courts will allow separate indictments of every money 
laundering act (e.g. in United States). In both instances, courts will have jurisdiction, 
whenever one money laundering act took place on their territory.171 
 
 
4.2.2 Location of Victims 
Jurisdiction can be determined also where the victim of a crime is situated in the 
territory of a state wishing to exercise jurisdiction over that crime. This has been 
regarded traditionally as a factor which determines the location of the criminal 
act. With most cybercrimes, however, the location of the victim can no longer be 
seen reasonably as a factor determining the location of the crime.172  
 
Moreover, some cybercrimes (for example hate-speech and child pornography) 
have identifiable victims. The same cannot be said of cyber money laundering. 
As a result, it may be concluded that the location of victims is an inadequate 
factor for countries to take into consideration when seeking to exercise 
jurisdiction over cyber money laundering. 
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4.2.3 Nationality of Perpetrator 
While territoriality is the major factor determining jurisdiction over most 
international crimes, jurisdiction can be based also on the nationality of the 
perpetrator.173 Article 22(1)(d) of the Convention on Cybercrime requires states 
parties to exercise jurisdiction over its nationals:  
if the offence is punishable under criminal law where it was committed or if the offence is 
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of any State.  
 
As the crime of cyber money laundering has no clearly identifiable victims, the 
nationality of the perpetrator becomes an essential tool in establishing 
jurisdiction over the crime. 
 
 
4.3 Investigation and Prosecution of Cyber Money Laundering 
As the internet and new technology render geography irrelevant, there could be 
numerous repercussions for countries wishing to investigate and prosecute the 
crime of cyber money laundering. As a starting point, jurisdiction may be lacking 
entirely when all of the countries involved have no authority to assert jurisdiction 
over the crime of cyber money laundering. Secondly, jurisdiction may exist but 
be impossible to enforce. This could arise when a country has not outlawed the 
crime of cyber money laundering and consequently refuses to extradite the 
perpetrator to a country wishing to prosecute. Lastly, jurisdiction may be claimed 
by several states simultaneously.174 
 
 
 
                                                 
173 Brenner (2004: 24). 
174 Brenner (2006: 190). 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
4.3.1 Investigation 
Since cyber money laundering is committed, at least in part, over the internet, 
the use of digital evidence will be essential in the prosecution of the crime.175 
Digital evidence is defined as: 
any information of probative value that is either stored or transmitted in a digital form [and 
is a] representation of information using numbers, such as binary digits, which are not 
accessible to the human senses.176  
 
Digital evidence is thus different from evidence which has been replicated from a 
non-digital format, as it consists primarily of intangible information which 
originates from digital devices.177 As a result, high levels of encryption and ease 
of manipulation are factors which ultimately affect the reliability of digital 
evidence.178  
 
In addition, digital evidence has a short life span and often is located in a foreign 
country, complicating even further the investigation of cyber money 
laundering.179 One author has made the following observations about the 
reliability of digital evidence: 
Firstly, altering (inserting, modifying or deleting) digital records is so easy that it may 
happen accidentally ... Secondly, there is a widespread belief that a competent forensic 
examination will invariably detect any manipulation of records. This belief is fallacious in 
the case of digital records ... Thirdly, there is an absence of generally recognised 
standards of best practice in digital evidence forensic procedures, and a lack of adequate 
training of forensic examiners ... Lastly, the modern world is becoming more digitally data 
dependent ... The sheer size of digital data on computers and networks imposes 
resource challenges to forensic investigators who must organise, scan and sift through 
these ‘electronic haystacks’  to determine who is responsible.180 
 
Cyber money launderers exploit the internet by commencing their laundering 
process in a different country, concealing evidence in a foreign location and by 
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taking advantage of the weaknesses in international co-operation. The internet 
consists of countless links, servers, hosts and routers.181 Internet-based digital 
evidence includes evidence from Internet Service Providers (ISPs) which are 
scattered all over the world.182  
 
ISPs supply their customers with access to the internet, e-mail and web site 
hosting.183 Each computer has a unique Internet Protocol (IP) address. The IP 
address of a computer is a number which simply describes the location of the 
computer in the internet.184 ISPs use log files to store information regarding the 
identification of a person who was using a specific IP address while accessing 
the internet via the ISP.185 These log files could then be used by law enforcement 
agencies to identify individuals suspected of cyber money laundering.  
 
However, ISPs do not keep these files indefinitely because of the costs involved 
in mass digital storage.186 Investigating a case of cyber money laundering would 
involve tracing digital evidence backwards from the completion of the crime to 
the implementation of the crime.187 Given the transnational scope of cyber 
money laundering, this would require the co-operation of foreign law 
enforcement agencies and multiple ISPs located in several countries in order to 
trace the internet communications. The immediate response thus should be to 
obtain preservation orders for all the countries involved in the overarching crime 
of cyber money laundering. However, preservation orders for cyber money 
laundering may be problematic due to time constraints. During the layering 
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phase of cyber money laundering, the perpetrator attempts to conceal the 
criminal origin of the dirty money. As a result, there is a concern that the fragile 
digital data will disappear unless they are secured immediately by the relevant 
ISP.188  
 
 
4.3.2 Prosecution 
Given the ease with which cyber money laundering can be achieved through the 
use of the internet, it is essential for prosecutors to equip themselves with 
sufficient knowledge to respond effectively.189 As technology continues to 
advance, it will create more opportunities for criminal exploitation. Further, the 
incorporation of technological improvements differs from country to country.190 
Countries which are slow to receive technological improvements may serve 
unwittingly as havens for cyber money launderers. There is thus a need to 
develop a legal and institutional framework which would enable prosecutions of 
new forms of crime.  
 
The extent of a prosecutor’s involvement in a cyber money laundering case will 
depend on his role within the criminal justice system of his country. In civil law 
countries, the decision to begin an investigation may rest with the prosecutor, 
depending on certain factors. For example, in the United States prosecutors are 
engaged often in the preparation, organisation and execution of criminal 
investigations, which provide for detailed prosecutorial oversight. In some 
countries, prosecutors may be involved even in the drafting of legislation and the 
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determination of a sentence following conviction.191 If prosecutors are involved in 
a case from an early stage it would ensure that investigations are efficient and 
that the rights of suspects are protected.  
 
In common law jurisdictions, prosecutors often must decide which cases to take 
on and which not. In other legal systems, prosecutors may be obligated to 
prosecute once there is sufficient evidence.192 However, most prosecutors face 
resource constraints and, as a result, a case which is not likely to end in any 
significant punishment may not be taken up. The resource limitation of most 
prosecutors is an important factor and may be a major obstacle in the 
prosecution of cyber money laundering. For example, the costs involved in 
bringing an ISP from France to South Africa are not trivial.  
 
Prosecutors also are responsible primarily for presenting evidence in court. In 
cases of cyber money laundering, the presentation of the evidence could be 
essential in the prosecution of the crime. This is because judges and jurors 
would be relatively unfamiliar with digital technology and its criminal 
exploitation.193 Essentially, the decision of a prosecutor inevitably is affected by 
socio-economic values and national interests. 
 
 
4.3.3 Substantive Criminal Law 
The generality of a country’s traditional criminal law will determine whether such 
law is flexible enough to embrace traditional crimes when they are committed 
with digital technology. The fact that property can exist in an intangible form on 
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the internet has brought about a broadening of the conventional form of criminal 
damage.194 Highly technical economic crimes seldom are committed against any 
identifiable victims. Still, they undermine the rule of law and contribute to a 
weakened economy and, in some instances, to terrorist financing. This is 
especially so in the case of cyber money laundering. 
 
At the very least, legislation should enable law enforcement agencies to obtain 
full records of all transactions made by or on behalf of cyber money launderers 
and enable them to share that information with other investigative agencies. 195 
 
Ideally, legislation should be general enough to encompass new emerging forms 
of crime, but not so general as to be impossibly vague. As one author has noted:  
Legislation that is over-broad or vague may be subject to inappropriate application. It may 
be seen as an invitation to the abuse of power. The legitimate goal of criminalizing 
communications in furtherance of terrorist conspiracies does not justify legislation that 
would also prohibit or discourage legitimate political expression. In order to avoid this 
problem, care must be taken to formulate laws as precise and specific as possible.196 
 
The truth is that technology invariably does advance faster than the law. Where 
existing law is unable readily to encompass new forms of technical and digital 
crimes, prosecutors would have no choice but to 'force' the facts into a form 
apparently consistent with the law.197  
 
 
4.3.4 Criminal Procedural Law 
One of the most dominant powers that a state can wield against its citizens is the 
power of search and seizure. It is thus essential that this power is used in 
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accordance with the rule of law.198 Although cyber money laundering occurs 
through the intricate web of cyberspace, cyber money launderers inevitably have 
to use digital devices in order to accomplish money laundering. According to the 
rule of law, digital devices would be protected also under privacy rights in as 
much as any other private property would be. The majority of countries require 
enforcement agencies to acquire formal judicial authority prior to searching or 
seizing property.199 Only in some countries is this authority vested in prosecutors 
or police. Regardless of this, authority to search or seize property ideally ought 
to be very detailed and contain probable cause of the commission of a crime.200  
 
 
4.3.5 Mutual Legal Assistance 
If, for example, a cybercrime is committed against individuals in Country A, 
Country B and Country C, the cyber criminal would have committed a crime in 
each of these countries. Provided each country has a penal law that criminalises 
the relevant conduct, the perpetrator could be prosecuted in any one of these 
countries.201 However, the matter becomes more complicated in relation to the 
issue of cyber money laundering. 
 
For a crime to be defined as money laundering, it must contain a placement, 
layering and integration phase. The same applies to cyber money laundering. 
While these elements may not be difficult to identify for an overarching crime of 
cyber money laundering, they could cause great difficulties in the prosecution 
thereof. For instance, if a cyber money launderer placed the dirty money in 
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Country A, layered the money in Country B and integrated the money in Country 
C, there may be doubt as to whether the crime would be prosecutable in any 
country as the elements of the crime are scattered across several jurisdictions.  
 
As the principle of universal jurisdiction does not apply to cyber money 
laundering, only countries involved in the crime will have jurisdiction to 
prosecute. From the example given above, it appears that when several 
countries are involved in a crime of cyber money laundering, they will be unable 
to prosecute the crime in isolation. Each would require co-operation from the 
others in the prosecution of the crime. Co-operation is especially necessary for 
collecting evidence of the offence. Without the co-operation of other countries, 
the prosecution of cyber money laundering by a single country surely would yield 
unsatisfactory results. 
 
Following the digital trail of a cyber money laundering offence always will be a 
great challenge. This necessitates high degrees of correspondence between 
countries and rapid responses in order to preserve digital evidence.202 There are 
two basic types of co-operation: informal legal assistance and formal mutual 
legal assistance.203 Informal assistance between countries is based on working 
relationships between police services of the countries in question and previous 
joint investigations.204  
 
Although more expeditious than formal mutual legal assistance, informal legal 
assistance can be relied on only in the absence of compulsory powers required 
by, for example, search warrants. Formal mutual legal assistance is traditionally 
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born of treaty arrangements between countries and is more cumbersome than 
informal legal assistance. It usually requires the exchange of formal documents 
and an offence that exceeds a certain threshold of severity.205 Although any 
country may request formal mutual legal assistance from any other country, it is 
usually easier with the existence of prior treaty arrangements.206  
 
Unfortunately, the framework of treaties and other arrangements which may form 
the basis of mutual legal assistance is far from ideal.207 Mutual legal assistance 
may also involve high costs and this burden is placed on the party providing the 
assistance.208 However, countries seeking assistance do sometimes cover the 
corresponding costs.209  
 
Even the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 
provides for certain cost relief and sharing provisions.210  This, however, will 
apply to cybercrimes only when they are committed by an organised criminal 
group.211 Another example of the movement toward harmonisation of cyber 
crime is the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber Crime. To date this is the 
most significant initiative in cyber crime control and seeks to achieve a degree of 
consistency in substantive and procedural criminal law in cases of cyber crime 
committed across national frontiers.212 
 
While perfect uniformity of substantive and procedural criminal law across the 
world's legal systems will be almost impossible to achieve, a degree of 
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consistency on core offences is somewhat more achievable.213  
 
 
4.3.6 Encryption 
The problems related to cybercrime are inflated by the widespread availability of 
encryption technology. This technology enables cyber criminals to conceal the 
content of electronic communications by mathematically encoding the 
transaction with a special formula called an encryption key.214 The receiving 
party must have this encryption key to decrypt successfully a coded 
transaction.215 Thus, encryption allows cyber money launderers to conceal 
information which could lead to exposure of their criminal activities and 
consequently be used against them in court.216 Encryption technology further 
allows cyber money launderers to conceal their identities or impersonate other 
users on the internet. 
 
Anti-money laundering authorities thus should be highly educated on the issue of 
encryption in order to investigate a matter of cyber money laundering.217 It is 
worthy of note that encryption also may cause severe complications during the 
prosecution phase. The right against self-incrimination is a well-established 
constitutional right in many countries. Should an accused then be required to 
provide the encryption key for encrypted information which could incriminate him, 
it could violate this fundamental constitutional right. 
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4.4 Confiscation and Forfeiture 
Pieth submits that the primary purpose of anti-money laundering law in the 
beginning was not so much to criminalise the behaviour of individuals but rather 
to secure the forfeiture of ill-gotten gains.218 The worldwide adoption of laws 
which enable confiscation of the proceeds of crime reflects the acknowledged 
importance of depriving a criminal of the profits of crime. These laws 
acknowledge that the more profitable the crime, the more difficult it becomes for 
law enforcement agencies to link the criminal to it.219 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which a state can retrieve stolen assets: 
criminal or civil forfeiture. Criminal forfeiture requires a conviction before assets 
can be forfeited to the state and is often referred to as conviction-based 
confiscation.220 Although more controversial than criminal forfeiture, civil 
forfeiture allows for confiscation of stolen assets without a conviction.  
 
South Africa and the United States are examples of countries where civil 
forfeiture is possible.221 In South Africa, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act of 
1998 enables the state to confiscate assets belonging to a person not convicted 
of any crime.222 The state must show merely that the assets are probably the 
proceeds of crime, taking into consideration all relevant factors.223  
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Historically, the United States has been in the forefront of proceeds of crime 
legislation and enforcement action in respect of money laundering.224 As early as 
1960, civil forfeiture was available in cases connected to money laundering 
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisation Act U.S.C. §1963 
(RICO) and the Controlled Substances Act, Continuing Criminal Enterprise 
Offence U.S.C. §848 (CEE). In addition, the Money Laundering Control Act 
U.S.C. §1956 provides for both criminal and civil forfeiture. In the United States 
virtually anything can be forfeited if it is shown that the thing was used in the 
facilitation of a crime. However, in the case of real property it is required that the 
role of such property in the facilitation of the crime must be substantial.225 
Interestingly, the United States adopts the doctrine of the fruit of the poisoned 
tree. This means, for example, that the equity received from the sale of a house 
which was purchased with laundered money may be forfeited.226  
 
From this the advantages of civil forfeiture become clear. Civil forfeiture requires 
proof on a balance of probabilities while criminal forfeiture requires proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Civil forfeiture is achieved through in rem proceedings, 
meaning that the proceedings are targeted at the property itself and not the 
person. This approach is founded on the proposition that the property (which 
could consist of money) is guilty of the offence of being used illegally.227  
The following is a list of examples of when it is necessary, or at least better, to do 
forfeiture civilly: 
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1. where forfeiture is uncontested, property could essentially be forfeited to the 
state by default; 
2. where the defendant has died, criminal forfeiture would be impossible; 
3. where the primary wrongdoer is unknown; 
4. where the property belongs to a third party and criminal proceedings cannot 
be brought against such third party; 
5. where the interests of justice do not require a criminal conviction.228 
 
If all countries are allowed to use civil forfeiture in securing the funds involved in 
the crime of cyber money laundering, it would be less difficult to recover stolen 
assets as the burden of proof is lower. By depriving criminals of enjoyment of the 
fruits of their crime, civil forfeiture would fulfil, to a large extent, the objectives of 
anti-money laundering initiatives. Also, civil forfeiture does not preclude a 
subsequent criminal prosecution. Thus, civil forfeiture is an ideal mechanism for 
recovering assets stolen by means of cyber money laundering. 
 
Ample experience of money laundering has shown just how easy it is to obscure 
the proceeds of crime. This is exacerbated in the case of cyber money 
laundering. As a result, financial centres currently place a lot of emphasis on 
developing a system which would allow for more effective freezing, confiscation, 
mutual legal assistance and repatriation of stolen assets.229  
 
But this will be effective only if it encompasses the co-operation of banks, 
lawyers, FIUs and law enforcement agencies, as well as public and private 
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forensic specialists.230 Co-operation during a financial investigation is essential in 
any strategy which is aimed at recovering the proceeds of crime.231  
 
Chapter 2 established the importance of the standards set by the FATF in the 
fight against money laundering. To this extent, the FATF is considered the main 
international anti-money laundering standard setter.232 Relevant to asset tracing, 
the main international anti-money laundering framework consists of the following 
elements: the criminalisation of money laundering, due diligence measures 
placed on financial and certain non-financial businesses and professions, the 
supervision of these institutions and the requirement to report suspicious 
transactions to FIUs.233 These elements have to be considered individually in 
order to identify their potential for the tracing and recovery of stolen assets in 
general. 
 
 
4.4.1 The Criminalisation of Money Laundering 
Individuals who work in financial institutions or deal with others’ assets remain 
the main focus of the criminal offence of money laundering. If these individuals 
become aware (or should be aware) that the proceeds they are receiving 
originate from a crime and do not refrain from accepting or transferring the 
proceeds, they too will be held criminally liable.234 Although cyber money 
launderers are capable of laundering money without the assistance of 
intermediaries, the possibility exists that funds eventually would pass through 
intermediaries (such as banks or brokers) during the laundering cycle. If these 
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individuals then are reminded of their possible criminal liability for money 
laundering, they are almost certain to co-operate with law enforcement agencies 
during the course of their investigations.235 In addition, the FATF recommends 
that countries should introduce criminal, civil or administrative liability for legal 
persons.236  
 
Although focusing on corruption (a possible predicate offence for money 
laundering), the United Nations Convention against Corruption insists on the 
same standard when it comes to money laundering.237 This, in turn, will ensure 
the co-operation of financial institutions in much the same way as it did with 
individuals working for such institutions. 
 
 
4.4.2 Due Diligence Measures 
The due diligence measures placed on financial institutions and designated non-
financial business and professions will be discussed in Chapter 5. For the 
purposes of asset recovery, the documents required by institutions to identify 
their clients, beneficial owners and the intention of the business relationship will 
constitute yet another source of information for law enforcement agencies 
investigating a case of money laundering.238  
 
As seen from Chapter 2, the FATF has recommended that institutions which offer 
financial services should be made subject also to due diligence provisions.239 In 
relation to cyber money laundering, this would mean that law enforcement 
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agencies would be capable also of using information from ‘alternative remittance 
banking’, such as the Hawala system.240 
 
 
4.4.3 Supervisory Measures 
All the institutions in a country which are subject to anti-money laundering 
legislation are also subject to oversight by a relevant state body. In general, 
these institutions would attempt first to address the requirements of their 
supervisors before thinking of the risk of a potential criminal investigation.241 
Avoiding criminal prosecution for cyber money laundering is an incentive for a 
financial institution, which could be used to the advantage of an investigator.  
 
This is done by informing the supervisory body of the constraints involved in 
investigating cases where supervised entities are involved, with the view to 
allowing the supervisor to remind the supervised entity of its obligations.242 As a 
last resort, this could be achieved also by identifying financial institutions which 
do not apply anti-money laundering provisions. Naming and shaming these 
institutions often has a greater impact than a criminal investigation, as these 
institutions rely heavily on their reputations within the markets in which they 
operate. 
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4.4.4 Reporting of suspicious transactions 
The reporting of suspicious transactions by institutions is probably the most 
interesting tool in an investigator’s arsenal for tracing stolen assets, especially 
with regard to cyber money laundering. When enforcement agencies believe that 
funds have been stashed away in financial institutions (or other designated 
institutions) in another jurisdiction, often they would not know which particular 
institution is involved. If they were then to request mutual legal assistance from a 
country with a relatively high number of financial institutions, such request would 
be considered to be a fishing expedition and rebuffed.243 How can this obstacle 
be overcome?  
 
Most banks are likely to file a suspicious activity report (SAR) if the information 
reaches the bank that its client is under investigation for a predicate offence to 
money laundering. The SAR would be filed with the FIU of the bank 
concerned.244 The FIU can then make the information available to its counterpart 
FIU in the country where the predicate offence took place. In turn, the receiving 
FIU could make the information available to the investigating authority tracing the 
stolen assets. However, in most instances this information can be made 
available as intelligence only and not as evidence.245 
 
 
4.5 Conflicting Jurisdictions 
As mentioned previously, cyber money laundering is almost always likely to 
result in the commission of the crime in multiple countries. If several of these 
countries then wish to prosecute the cyber money launderer, the result is ‘a 
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positive jurisdictional conflict’.246 In other words, more than one country would 
claim jurisdiction over a perpetrator on the basis of the same conduct. 
 
However, in reality each country would not seek to prosecute the cyber money 
launderer for precisely the same crime. Instead, countries would prosecute for 
crimes committed within their territory as part of the larger ongoing crime of 
cyber money laundering. Each country would then have to prioritise its 
respective claims in order to exercise jurisdiction over the perpetrator.247 
Provided countries ensure that they do not violate the principle of double 
jeopardy, a perpetrator could be prosecuted sequentially by different countries, 
all of which have jurisdiction.248 
 
The Convention on Cybercrime offers little guidance on the issue of conflicting 
jurisdictions. It merely states that ‘Parties involved shall ... consult with a view to 
determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution’.249 Further, 
according to the explanatory note, such consultation is not obligatory.250 Even 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime merely 
states in, in Article 15(5), that: 
If a State Party exercising its jurisdiction under paragraph 1 or 2 of this article has been 
notified, or has otherwise learned, that one or more other States Parties are conducting 
an investigation, prosecution or judicial proceeding in respect of the same conduct, the 
competent authorities of those States Parties shall, as appropriate, consult one another 
with a view to coordinating their actions. 
 
One author is of the opinion that cases of positive jurisdictional conflicts should 
be determined by the reasonableness standard.251 This standard means that a 
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country’s exercise of jurisdiction to proscribe and adjudicate must not be 
unreasonable. In determining reasonableness the following list of factors may be 
useful: 
1. the extent to which the activity takes place and has an effect within the 
territory of the state; 
2. nationality, residence or economic activity of the perpetrator; 
3. the importance of regulating cybercrimes (more specifically cyber money 
laundering) to the regulating state; 
4. the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the 
activity; 
5. the likelihood of conflict with another state also wishing to prosecute the 
same crime; 
6. whether the person or thing is present in the territory of the state; and 
7. whether the person has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction.252 
 
Although these factors are a mere guideline, it remains uncertain which factors 
should have the more weight in determining positive jurisdictional conflicts. It is 
clear that a perpetrator’s nationality and physical presence will play a big role 
during this deliberation. With cyber money laundering other factors may be 
relevant also, such as the location of ISPs and computers from which the crime 
was committed.253 
 
Since cyber money laundering renders borders irrelevant, an increase in 
jurisdictional conflicts is almost inevitable.254 In this regard, the traditional 
approach of negotiation between countries is no longer a viable option, because 
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negotiation is time-consuming and unpredictable.255 Sections 4.5.1 – 4.5.5 below 
consider factors that could be taken into account in the resolution of conflicting 
jurisdictional claims in relation to cyber money laundering. 
 
 
4.5.1 Custody of the Perpetrator 
A perpetrator’s presence within a country is the most logical and most basic 
rationale for asserting jurisdiction over such perpetrator. However, the issue 
becomes more complex in the case of cyber money laundering. As mentioned 
earlier, cyber money laundering renders borders between countries irrelevant. 
The question then is which of the several competing countries is allowed to bring 
the perpetrator to justice for the commission of the crime? This does not cause 
problems for cybercrimes in general, since each country could simply prosecute 
the perpetrator for an offence specific to its legal regime, if the criminal 
transaction is factually and legally severable.256 As a result, the fact that one 
country could prosecute before another would be immaterial.257  
 
However, cyber money laundering problematises the issue since, in most 
instances, the location of a cyber money launderer is irrelevant. Such offenders 
are capable of laundering their money from virtually anywhere in the world, using 
the internet. 
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4.5.2 Damage 
The actual harm caused to a country by an act of cyber money laundering could 
be a factor in considering a country’s claim to prosecute a perpetrator.258 
Although this seems like a rational factor to take into consideration, it may be 
extremely problematic in the case of cyber money laundering. Since cyber 
money laundering aims at concealing the proceeds of crime, it may be very 
difficult to determine the actual damage incurred by a country. 
 
Regardless of the difficulties associated with assessing actual damage incurred 
by countries through cyber money laundering, damage still could be a relevant 
factor to take into consideration. However, there is a need to develop certain 
indicators which would assist in this assessment.259 An obvious indication of 
harm would be the impact on the country from which the dirty money originated. 
In this sense, funds would move illegally from the normal economic structure of a 
country to that of another. In essence, the country from which the dirty money 
has originated would find itself in a weaker economic position. However, since 
money laundering in general has been linked to terrorist financing, the same 
argument can be made for the country which receives dirty money.  
 
More specifically, this refers to the country into which the laundered money is 
integrated. Whether a weak economy is better than an increase in terrorist 
financing is unclear. Certainly, both could have negative effects on the population 
of a country.  
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4.5.3 Nationality of the Perpetrator 
In the traditional concept of crime, the nationality of the perpetrator is always a 
factor counting in favour of awarding jurisdictional priority.260 However, one 
author is of the opinion that, in the case of cybercrimes, the nationality of the 
perpetrator should be a factor that militates against awarding jurisdictional 
priority.261 As another author has noted: 
nationality-based criminal jurisdiction reflects the need [for one state] to maintain good 
relations with other states ... by deterring conduct by its own nationals that reflects poorly 
on the state abroad.262 
 
Indirectly, the jurisdiction in which the perpetrator performed the act of cyber 
money laundering could be said to have ‘allowed’ the commission of the offence 
against other countries. Why should a country then be given jurisdiction to 
prosecute a crime simply because its citizen committed the crime of cyber 
money laundering stretching over several jurisdictions? 
 
 
4.5.4 Strength of the Case 
As the ultimate goal of the fight against cyber money laundering is bringing the 
perpetrator to justice, the strength of the case a country can bring should always 
be an important factor to take into consideration. This can be indicated by the 
extent to which a country has collected evidence tying a suspect to cyber money 
laundering, whether the perpetrator could raise any objections to the use of 
specific evidence, the applicability of the statute of limitations and any other 
relevant factor in the prosecution of the perpetrator.263  
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4.5.5 Fairness 
In a case of cyber money laundering, the fairness and impartiality of a 
prosecution in a particular country is an important factor to take into 
consideration when prioritising conflicting jurisdiction cases.264 This should 
include also considerations of convenience and practicality as to where the 
prosecution can take place.265  
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
The truth is that technology has created the means to launder money by use of 
completely untraceable digital currency. While current money laundering laws 
apply to cyber money laundering, the actual effect of these laws may be limited. 
This is especially so when dealing with the issue of jurisdiction over cyber money 
laundering. The transnational scope of the crime complicates traditional theories 
of jurisdiction while simultaneously allowing for the possibility of positive 
jurisdictional conflicts. Encryption, lack of  data storage requirements on ISPs 
and resource constraints placed on those charged with investigating and 
prosecuting money laundering impedes the fight against cyber money 
laundering. 
In an asset recovery effort pertaining to cyber money laundering, it is the 
investigation phase which constitutes the core element.266  A country within 
which funds have been secreted will not confiscate or repatriate those funds to 
the country of origin unless sufficient evidence is presented. This evidence in 
turn must link the funds to an illegal activity and be admissible in a court of law. 
                                                 
264 Brenner (2006: 206). 
265 Brenner (2006: 206). 
266 Basel Institute on Governance (2009: 19). 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
As the investigation phase of cyber money laundering would constitute also the 
core element of recovering assets which were laundered, it is necessary to 
develop efficient investigative and provisional methods to identify, trace and 
rapidly freeze property in order to facilitate eventual confiscation. 
 
Finally, if positive jurisdictional conflicts do occur, factors such as damage, 
fairness and nationality of the perpetrator will assist states in the resolution of 
conflicting claims. Unfortunately, there is no clear hierarchy between all of these 
factors. It is therefore important to develop ideas on how to resolve positive 
jurisdictional conflicts, beyond the obvious need for countries consulting each 
other in particular cases.267 
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CHAPTER 5  
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES TO COMBAT CYBER MONEY LAUNDERING 
 
5.1 Review of Existing Approaches and Ideas 
As was seen in Chapter 3, there are numerous international instruments and 
institutions involved in the fight against money laundering. However, when 
combating cyber money laundering, the initiatives of these international 
instruments and institutions fall short of what is required. Regardless of this, the 
existing principles relating to customer due diligence and the ‘know your 
customer regime’ will be appropriate still in combating cyber money laundering. 
 
 
5.1.1 Know Your Customer Regime 
Identifying customers in cyberspace is difficult and knowing how to do it is largely 
a matter of learning through experience. At the very least, anonymous banking 
and transacting should be avoided at all costs.268 The improvement of 
technology makes it even more difficult to identify customers. Cyber money 
launderers are capable of concealing their identity through encryption technology 
and financial institutions should be aware of this risk. 
 
The KYC regime originally started out as a mere instruction to financial 
institutions and then became a key tool to combat money laundering.269 It was 
aimed originally at financial institutions to motivate them to identify their 
customers and to report any suspicious transactions.270 These notions would 
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later become mandatory.271 However, KYC goes further than simply knowing the 
names and addresses of customers; it also involves knowing something about 
their background and activities.272 If transactions then pass through accounts 
which are inconsistent with what the bank would expect from a customer, then 
the bank may be required to report such transactions to supervisory authorities.  
 
It must be noted that there is unfortunately no international 'hard law' which 
contributes to this programme. Nevertheless, international organisations such as 
the FATF have contributed significantly to its content. For this programme to be 
successful it must consist of four components: knowledge of your customer, the 
obligation to report suspicion or knowledge of money laundering, the retention of 
certain records and, lastly, awareness-raising and training.273 
 
 
5.1.2 Customer Due Diligence 
The FATF has established certain customer due diligence (CDD) and record-
keeping measures to be taken by financial institutions and non-financial 
businesses and professions to prevent money laundering. CDD is intended to 
limit criminal access to the financial system and to other means of placing the 
proceeds of crime.274 Focus should be placed on successfully preventing cyber 
money laundering at the placement stage, before the layering process can 
disguise the illegal origin of funds.275 In order successfully to curb new 
techniques of money laundering while simultaneously promoting technological 
development, governments should focus on regulating the illegal transaction, 
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rather than the technology of online-banking.276 As a starting point, the FATF 
recommends that: 
countries should ensure that financial institution secrecy laws do not inhibit 
implementation of the FATF Recommendations.277  
 
The FATF customer due diligence measures to be taken are as follows: 
1. Identifying the customer and verifying his or her identity using reliable and independent 
data or information; 
2. Identifying the beneficial owner, and taking reasonable measures to verify his or her 
identity such that the financial institution is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial 
owner is. For legal persons and arrangements the financial institutions should take 
reasonable measures to understand the ownership and control structure of the customer; 
3. Obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship; 
and 
4. Conducting ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutiny of 
transactions undertaken throughout the course of that relationship.278 
 
In addition, the FATF requires financial institutions to perform enhanced due 
diligence for high risk categories. Recommendation 8 of the FATF is of vital 
importance in the fight against cyber money laundering. It requires financial 
institutions to pay special attention to any money laundering threats that may 
arise from new or developing technologies that might favour anonymity. As a 
result, financial institutions should have policies and procedures in place to 
address any specific risks associated with business relationships or transactions 
which are not face-to-face. As the internet provides high degrees of anonymity, 
financial institutions should be in a position to identify cases of cyber money 
laundering. Unfortunately, criminals who abuse technology are always at the 
forefront of new technological developments. Because of this, vulnerable 
institutions and law enforcement agencies should ensure that they have 
personnel who are highly skilled in these areas. 
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5.2 A New Approach 
Traditional methods of combating money laundering are no longer effective. 
Cyber money laundering has shown just how easy it is for criminals to launder 
proceeds of crime quickly and with relatively low risk by using the internet. The 
difficulty in monitoring crimes committed over the internet is evident from the fact 
that internet-based financial crimes are almost invisible.279 Because of this, 
funding which was spent on identifying criminals and proceeds of crime now 
would be spent better on preventing computer-generated crime. 
 
In Chapter 4 the fragility of digital evidence was discussed. Ease of manipulation 
and advances in encryption technology are factors which ultimately affect the 
reliability of digital evidence. Because of this, focus should be shifted from 
identifying money laundering towards the prevention thereof. This could be 
accomplished by focusing on commercial and legal awareness.280 However, 
encryption software could be used also to the advantage of those wishing to fight 
cyber money laundering. Financial institutions should be in a position to encrypt 
information which is vulnerable to cyber money laundering. 
 
Because it is possible for banks to serve their customers from anywhere in the 
world through the internet, national regulators cannot prevent financial 
institutions from setting up business in inadequately regulated areas. This 
practice questions the credibility of banking regulation in general.281 By 
addressing this issue, it is possible that some of the barriers to fighting cyber 
money laundering could be overcome. Here, a two-pronged approach has been 
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suggested.282  
 
Firstly, by allowing the financial industry to regulate itself, clearer guidelines on 
how to identify cyber money laundering may come from the industry itself. 
Secondly, regulators could experiment with these guidelines by creating 
conditions for the approval of bank applications for product expansion.283 
 
Preventing cyber money laundering is a daunting task for any law enforcement 
agency or organisation. However, given the difficulties of fragile digital evidence, 
prevention is the only feasible technique against cyber money laundering. 
Prevention initiatives are designed to deter criminals from using private 
individuals and institutions to launder the proceeds of their crimes.284 Law 
enforcement agencies and other institutions dealing with cyber money 
laundering thus should take adequate steps to identify weaknesses in security 
systems which could be infiltrated via the internet. By using advanced and 
updated computer software, financial institutions would be able to prohibit 
access to any vulnerable information which could be reached through the 
internet.  
 
The discussion of CDD highlights the role which financial and non-financial 
institutions could play in preventing cyber money laundering. However, the scope 
of the FATF due diligence and record-keeping measures should be broadened in 
order to counter cyber money laundering effectively. For example, requiring ISPs 
to implement the CDD and record-keeping measures of the FATF would facilitate 
the tracing of those responsible for cyber money laundering.  
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Unfortunately, requiring ISPs to identify each of their customers would be a 
herculean task, as preserving high volumes of data is extremely expensive. 
Nevertheless, the advantages gained by applying the FATF Recommendations 
to all institutions and businesses vulnerable to cyber money laundering cannot 
be overlooked. 
 
 
5.2.1 Undercover Investigations 
Cyber money launderers often use false identities while conducting their 
laundering activities over the internet in order to offer an extra barrier of 
protection against investigators. In some jurisdictions, it is possible for law 
enforcement agencies to impersonate private citizens in the course of 
investigations on the internet. For example, it is common in the United States for 
investigators to develop elaborate traps in order to identify possible cyber 
criminals. As early as 1995, the United States Security Service launched an 
investigation codenamed Operation Cybersnare. Investigators established an 
internet discussion group from which individuals could purchase stolen cellular 
phone access numbers and credit card numbers. Criminals who joined the group 
and then offered illegal products for sale were identified and prosecuted.285  
 
Other countries do not permit internet investigations as they can, and often do, 
infringe on privacy rights and freedom of expression.286 However, the 
advantages that undercover internet-based investigations can contribute to the 
fight against cyber money laundering cannot be ignored.  
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Allowing investigators to create and monitor environments on the internet which 
are conducive to money laundering attacks would assist in the prevention of 
cyber money laundering at an early stage. But, as there is a real threat of 
violating privacy and other rights of innocent individuals, online undercover 
investigations should be subject to strict guidelines and vigorous oversight.287 
 
 
5.2.2 Remote Searches 
Improvements in technology have complicated traditional search and seizure 
measures. Often with cyber money laundering, the evidence required for 
investigation and eventual prosecution may be dispersed across an entire 
computer network stretching over multiple countries. This evidence may be far 
removed from the physical location of a search, but still may be accessible from 
digital devices at a particular location.288 While investigators may not be 
concerned that their cyberspace investigations are taking them into the 
jurisdictions of another country, authorities in that country may be very 
concerned.289 As cyber money laundering often is concluded in or routed through 
other countries, such searches will be necessary in the fight against it. Australia 
has recognised this need for 'remote transnational internet searches'. According 
to Australian law, there are no geographical limits upon the investigation of 
cybercrime, nor is there any obligation to acquire consent from third parties.290  
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Although remote searches may interfere with the sovereignty of states to some 
degree, they are necessary in the fight against cyber money laundering. If 
investigators had to be mindful of accidently traversing the 'cyberspace 
jurisdiction' of another country, attempts to bring cyber money launderers to 
justice surely would be impeded. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Unlike other areas of cybercrime law, a country’s ability to assert jurisdiction over 
cyber money launderers sometimes may seem problematic. Cyber money 
laundering encompasses elements from both cybercrimes and the traditional 
concept of money laundering. While most international instruments focus either 
on cybercrime or money laundering in isolation, none of them specifically 
addresses the issue of cyber money laundering. Although traditional principles 
relating to real-world crimes can be used to justify jurisdiction over cyber 
criminals, no real progress has been made in determining cases of positive 
jurisdictional conflicts. For this reason, the issue of prioritising claims of 
competing jurisdictions needs to be resolved by the international community. 
 
Although some progress has been made in the furtherance of international co-
operation to combat cybercrime in general, a great deal more remains to be 
accomplished. There remains a need for expeditious preservation orders of 
digital evidence, consistency in substantive and procedural law that would permit 
real time tracing of cyber money laundering trails, and the possibility of 
requesting mutual legal assistance via e-mail.291 
 
The use of multiple jurisdictions increases problems of investigation and 
prosecution. However, in most jurisdictions, serious problems of investigation 
begin long before money is moved to other jurisdictions.292 Many police forces 
are equipped too poorly to investigate sophisticated forms of money laundering.  
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In developing countries, resource constraints on investigators and prosecutors 
aggravate the problem. With some notable exceptions, they do not have the 
resources either to employ or buy the forensic accounting, financial analysis, 
computer skills, and ongoing legal advice needed to unravel sophisticated and 
new forms of crimes.293 
 
While the laws of some countries allow for general search warrants, others 
require a great amount of detail about the property to be searched or seized.294 
This inevitably creates difficulties in combating cyber money laundering. 
Because of its transnational scope, countries ideally should have similar 
provisions relating to the search and seizure of property used in the commission 
of an act of cyber money laundering. In the absence of uniformity among 
countries, the prosecution and investigation of cyber money laundering would be 
unpredictable and sluggish. As cyber money laundering necessitates rapid 
preservation orders for property used in the money laundering scheme, the time 
wasted by authorities applying for search warrants could be spent better. After 
all, the internet would allow cyber money launderers to transfer funds 
instantaneously from one end of the world to another. The use of traditional 
methods thus is inadequate in the fight against cyber money laundering. While 
these methods do protect against the violation of the rule of law, they are 
outdated and new methods need to be developed. 
 
Although there is no magic formula which could cure the internet of cyber money 
laundering, it can be combated and diminished. The first step towards that 
objective may be a wider acceptance of the Convention on Cybercrime which 
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allows for expedient international co-operation and harmonisation of 
cybercriminal offences among legal systems.  
 
However, this would require wider public awareness and would take time and 
effort. What is more, a Convention alone would not suffice to address the issue 
of cyber money laundering effectively. It must be accompanied by the political 
will of government actually to implement its provisions. This is especially true for 
emerging economies, where financial havens for money laundering have been 
embedded in the economic structure of the country. Focus should be placed on 
developing traditional approaches while simultaneously allowing for the 
development of new techniques in order effectively to combat cyber money 
laundering. While undercover investigations and remote searches are likely to 
infringe the rights of innocent individuals, they will prove most useful in the 
prevention of cyber money laundering. 
 
Unfortunately, civil forfeiture remains a highly contested means of asset forfeiture 
and as a result countries have been slow in adopting its remedies. As Cassela 
has noted: 
The point of all of this is that it is not enough for all of us to agree that the asset 
forfeiture laws are an important means of recovering the proceeds of crime, if all we 
mean by that is that we should have the ability to make a confiscation order part of the 
defendant’s sentence in a criminal case. There is a significant and essential role to be 
played by civil forfeiture actions directed at the property itself. Many countries have 
enacted such laws, and I would urge others to do so.  
 
Properly managed and directed, the recovery of stolen assets through the use of 
civil remedies available can be expeditious, cost effective and extremely 
detrimental for the criminals involved in cyber money laundering. 295 
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Once the proceeds of the crime are integrated successfully into the financial 
system, many laundering operators take the precaution of moving money 
through more than one tax haven and shell company.296 If a cyber money 
laundering operation has not been detected before the proceeds of crime are 
moved to other jurisdictions, there will be little chance of a successful 
prosecution or forfeiture of proceeds.  
 
 
Although the most sophisticated cyber money laundering operations effectively 
may be immune from prosecution, there is room for optimism. While the 
advancement of technology has created countless opportunities for cyber money 
launderers, criminals have gone free only because the substantive criminal law 
has yet to be brought into the digital age. However, this too will change as 
consensus grows on the detrimental effects of money laundering and the relative 
ease with which it can now be conducted over the internet. 
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